Usage of Fault Detection Isolation & Recovery (FDIR) in Constellation (CxP) Launch Operations by Lewis, Mark et al.
Usage of Fault Detection Isolation & Recovery (FDIR) in 
Constellation (CxP) Launch Operations 
Bob Ferrell l , Mark Lewis2 and Jose Perotti3 
NASA, Kennedy Space Center, FL, 32899 
Rebecca Oostdyk4 
ASRC Aerospace, Kennedy Space Center, FL, 32899 
Lilly Spirkovska, Ph.D.s 
NASA, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035-1000 
David Ha1l6 
SeT Inc., Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035-1000 
and 
Barbara Brown7 
NASA, Ames Research Center @ KSC, Kennedy Space Center, FL, 32899 
This paper will explore the usage of Fault Detection Isolation & Recovery (FDIR) in the 
Constellation Exploration Program (CxP), in particular Launch Operations at Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC). NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) is 
currently funding a project that is developing a prototype FDIR to demonstrate the 
feasibility of incorporating FDIR into the CxP Ground Operations Launch Control System 
(LCS). An architecture that supports multiple FDIR tools has been formulated that will 
support integration into the CxP Ground Operation's Launch Control System (LCS). In 
addition, tools have been selected that provide fault detection, fault isolation, and anomaly 
detection along with integration between Flight and Ground elements. 
I. Introduction 
Fault Detection Isolation & Recovery (FDIR) has been a high-level requirement for NASA's Constellation Exploration Program (CxP) since its inception. One of the main drivers for this is to enable more efficient 
launch processing through faster fault isolation. This FDIR requirement has been levied on 3 main components of 
CxP: the Ares crew launch vehicle (CL V), Orion Capsule, and Ground Operations (also commonly referred to as 
Launch Processing). 
Under CxP Ground Operations, the Launch Control System (LCS) is being developed to provide the command 
and control capability for Ground processing in support of GroundlLaunch Operations at Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC). 
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As part of the CXP initial concept development, a reportl entitled "Diagnostic Technology Evaluation Report for 
On-Board Crew Launch Vehicle" was performed by NASA Ames Research Center (ARC). This report evaluated the 
state of art practice in embedded fault detection and diagnosis technologies for Crew Launch Vehicle (CL V) 
requirements development. Based on the results of this report, both the Orion and the Ares launch vehicle selected 
the Testability Engineering And Maintenance System (TEAMS) toolset. TEAMS is a Commercial Off The Shelf 
(COTS) product by Qualtech Systems Inc. (QSI) utilized to implement FDIR. 
However, the initial LCS allocation for the FDIR requirement was to have individual sub-systems (i.e. Liquid 
Hydrogen (LH2), Liquid Oxygen (LOX), Ground Special Power (GSP), Main Propulsion System (MPS), Avionics, 
Pneumatics, etc.) perform separate FDIR. This approach is similar in nature to how the current Space Shuttle 
Launch Processing System (LPS) handles FDIR at KSC. 
Recognizing this as an opportunity for improvement, ETDP approved a FDIR task as shown in Fig. 1 under 
NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) . This task is funded under the Intelligent Systems 
Health Management (ISHM) project. 
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Figure 1. Exploration Technology Development Program under 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
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The FDIR task, as shown in Fig. 2, is one of several tasks in the ISHM Project for ETDP. All of these tasks are 
developmental in nature and have a goal of maturing technologies and methods. Under this approach, FDIR is 
intended and designed to be integrated with Ground Operations to automate fault detection and isolation during 
maintenance and checkout, as well as launch countdown activities of ground and launch vehicle systems. In 
addition, the FDIR architecture will support the integration of several ISHM capabilities or tools. 
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Figure 2. Project Management Structure of Exploration Technology Development Program's 
Intelligent System Health Management Project 
As part of this task's effort, the main goal of the FDIR task is to prove the feasibility of a certifiable FDIR 
approach for CXP ground operations and to reduce the associated technology risk in implementing it. In order to 
'support this main goal , the FDIR task has several objectives that have been formulated . The first objective is to 
select, develop and mature ISHM tools to provide anomaly detection and FDIR for CXP ground operations. 
Under ARC leadership, two tools have been selected for FDIR. The TEAMS toolset has been chosen as the fault 
isolation tool due to the commonality with the Ares Launch Vehicle and Orion Crew Vehicle. The ARC developed 
Inductive Monitoring System (IMS) has been chosen as the anomaly detection tool. 
The second objective of the FDIR task is to develop an architecture for integrated FDIR, including both vehicle 
and ground. This architecture supports not only the real-time operations, but also model integration for ground and 
flight/vehicle fault models. Details of the functional fault modeling required by the TEAMS toolset is presented in 
another paper2 at this conference. 
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In support of an integrated ground and flight modeling effort, the scope of the FDIR task was increased to allow 
a cooperative effort with the Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype CGDP) project. Ares I-X was the first uncrewed 
test flight of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. The Ares I-X GDp3 was a project to produce a prototype ground 
diagnostic system that was demonstrated during Ares I-X pre-launch periods at KSC. In addition, and more 
importantly, the prototype was deployed to Hangar AE at KSC. At Hanger AE, the prototype was interfaced with 
live data from the Ares I-X vehicle. During the Ares I-X launch, outputs of the tools were displayed in Hangar AE 
successfully. 4 
Fig 3. shows the scope of the FDIR task under ISHM, along with the interaction between the Ares I-X GDP and 
·the FDIR task. 
ETDP ISHM Scope 
Legend: 
FFM: Functional Fault Model 
FDIR: Fau lt Detection, Isolation & Recovery 
lH2: Uquid Hydrogen Subsystem 
TVC: Thrust Vector Controller Subsystem 
CxP-Wide Deployment 
Decision for FDIR 
* Ground Diagnostic Prototype task led by Mark Schwabacher/ARC 
Figure 3. Scope of FauIt Detection, Isolation and Recovery task, including Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic 
Prototype interaction. 
Additional objectives include providing a path for certification of the FDIR architecture along with assessing 
'FDIR performance capability. Performance testing of the TEAMS real time tool, was performed at the vendor's 
location, and documented. These results were presented5 at an earlier IEEE conference. The task will also provide 
implementation/deployment options for integration within LCS. 
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Finally, the task has an out-year objective to initiate proof-of-concepts for ground subsystem prognostics 
applications which is beyond the scope of this paper to cover. For ease of purpose, the FDIR task will be referred to 
as the FDIR project in the rest of this paper. 
II. LCS & FDIR Architecture 
CXP ground processing/operation's LCS is a typical customized command and control system. The basic 
architecture of LCS is shown in Fig. 4. It is within this architectural framework that FDIR must be integrated in 
·order to be successful. 
























The FlJlR project team has evaluated numerous architectural issues in determining what they feel is the optimum 
architectural solution for FDIR. As shown in Fig. 5, this architecture allows the addition of tools without changing 
.the higher level architect of FDIR or its interfaces with LCS. This architecture allows the embedding of FDIR 
within LCS with minimal impact at design time and in future sustaining engineering. 
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Figure 5. FDIR Architecture Block Diagram 
The FDIR project team, in conjunction with the LCS project team, evaluated numerous approaches to determine 
the optimum insertion of the FDIR architecture into the LCS system. As shown in Fig 6. the project teams inserted 
FDIR functionality into several areas of LCS. Once the FDIR functionality has been inserted into the command and 
control structure, we refer to this functionality as Integrated Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (IFDIR). 
As can be seen in the figure, the FDIR functionality is allocated into three main areas of LCS as follows: 
1) FDIR Server Partition- This is a partition where the FDIR application software tools run. Currently 
TEAMS and IMS are the only selected tools for FDIR. 
2) Application Server Partition - This is the partition where Integrated Launch Operations Applications 
(ILOAs) and an application specific to FDIR will reside. 
3) Display Server Partition - This is a partition where the display services run that enable end user viewing of 
FDIR results. 
This provides the optimal solution to meeting both LCS requirements and FDIR requirements, while keeping 
sustaining engineering for the future in mind. 
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Figure 6. IFDIR Functional Allocation Diagram 
III. TEAMS Toolset 
As previously mentioned the TEAMS toolset or software suite was chosen to provide fault isolation for the FDIR 
project. The TEAMS software products include TEAMS Designer, TEAMS-Real Time (RT) and TEAMS Remote 
Diagnostic Server (RDS). TEAMS Designer is the user interface for building and analyzing the functional fault 
models (FFMs). It provides a graphical environment where the system's failure modes, components, hierarchical 
structure, interconnections, and observation points are captured in block diagrams that closely resemble system 
schematics. TEAMS-RT is the software engine that interprets a set of pass or fail results at the observation points to 
determine whether the failure modes and components in the model are good, bad, suspect or unknown in real-time . 
. TEAMS RDS is a server application which provides session management and archival services for one or more 
instances of TEAMS-RT. Although TEAMS-RT is a standalone product, a customer may opt to use TEAMS RDS 
for its management features in lieu of writing custom software that performs the same functions. The TEAMS 
COTS products have more capability than FFM creation and real-time fault isolation, but the tool was chosen for the 
FDIR project specifically for those functions . 
After a model is created in TEAMS Designer, the model information is exported in the form of a dependency 
matrix (D-Matrix). The D-Matrix contains rows of failure modes and columns of observation points, or test points. 
If a particular failure mode is detectable by a test point, a one is placed in the D-Matrix at the intersection of the 
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failure mode and test point. A model will export one D-Matrix for each system mode or configuration that is 
identified by the modeler. The system modes are defined by unique combinations of switches in the model that 
enable or disrupt the failure effect propagation paths (FEPPs). 
Once the D-Matrices have been defined, the TEAMS-RT engine uses them to isolate faults to a failure mode or 
modes based on the pass or fail state of the test points. The TEAMS-RT engine outputs lists of failure modes that 
·are "bad", "suspect" and "unknown", and all other failure modes are assumed "good." A failure mode which is 
"good," or not failed, is one which is mapped to any test point with a pass result. A "bad" failure mode is one which 
has a FEPP to a test point with a failed result, where the test point is not mapped to any other failure modes besides 
failure modes that have already been determined to be "good." A "suspect" failure mode is one which has a FEPP 
to a test point with a failed result and the failure mode is not the only failure mode mapped to that test point. 
"Suspect" failure modes are by definition an ambiguity group for a single test point. Finally, "unknown" failure 
modes are those failure modes whose FEPPs map only to test points for which there are no pass or fail results. 
Since the model includes hierarchy information that relates a failure mode to a component or other higher level 
(such as a line replaceable unit or subsystem), the same D-Matrix can be used to diagnose the system at different 
·levels of resolution depending on the needs of the application 
IV. IMS 
IMS uses a data-driven machine learning technique that automatically extracts system parameter relationships 
and interactions from archived nominal system data producing a monitoring capability quickly for almost any 
system for which archived nominal data is available. IMS does not require knowledge engineers or modelers to 
capture precise details of system operation. It only requires archived nominal data. Lacking that, IMS can learn the 
·relationship based on the parameter values from a high-fidelity simulator, with the accuracy of the simulator 
determining the accuracy of learned monitoring capability. When neither operational nor simulated data is available 
for a system, IMS can be trained on a very similar system. However, as with simulated data, the accuracy of the 
.learned monitoring capability will depend on the similarity of the systems. 
IMS has two phases: training and monitoring. Training is done off-line and monitoring can be done on-line (real-
time monitoring) or off-line (post-flight analysis). The goal during the training phase is to learn how the system 
normally behaves. The input to the learning algorithm is a data set representing nominal system operation. The 
training flow consists of the following: From the full set of data sensors available, the user selects the subset of 
parameters that adequately encode the behavior of the system. These parameters, normalized and weighted to assign 
. desired significance, are formed into a data vector. The user can then clean/validate the training set by eliminating 
outlier vectors. IMS is trained on most of the cleaned data set, with the exception of a portion left out to validate 
learning generalization. When satisfied with the performance (generalization and speed on the target hardware), IMS 
is trained on the full, cleaned data set. 
The goal of the monitoring step is to determine if the system is behaving differently than during operations when 
training data was collected. The monitoring step extracts the relevant parameters from the incoming real-time 
system data, normalizes and weights them, as was done during training, and then compares the incoming vector to 
the clusters generated during training. It outputs similarity scores, the distance between the vector and the nearest 
cluster for the vector as a whole (a composite score) and a distance from the nearest cluster for each parameter 
·separately. These distances represent the deviation of the current operation from nominal operations as defined by 
the training set - a measure of how "out of family" the behavior is. These scores can then be sent through an Alert 
Logic Filter to filter out data spikes and issue alerts only when a specified number of sequential incoming vectors 
are anomalous. Alternatively, the scores can be plotted allowing users to assess the severity of any system anomalies 
and watch for worsening trends over time. 
V. Conclusion 
FDIR is intended and designed to be integrated with Ground Operations to automate fault detection & isolation 
and anomaly detection during maintenance and checkout as well as launch countdown activities of ground and 
launch vehicle systems. The FDIR architecture described in this paper supports the integration of tools to support 
these activities and future tools. 
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The two initial tools chosen for incorporation into the FDIR project are the TEAMS toolset from Qualtech 
.Systems Inc. and IMS from NASA ARC. By integrating FDIR functionality into LCS as described in this paper the 
following benefits are expected to be achieved: 
1) Increased Crew Safety - Improve timely detection of mission-critical and life-critical failures and the 
identification/initiation/execution of recovery procedures. 
2) Increased System Availability - Improve system availability to perform intended mission and meet CxP 
operability requirements. 
3) Reduced LifecycIe Costs - Provide more efficient and effective isolation of failures. 
It is hoped that the knowledge gained during the execution of this project will be applied not only to current and 
future launch systems at KSC, but will also find use for future extra-planetary missions 
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This presentation will explore the usage of Fault Detection Isolation & Recovery (FDIR) in the Constellation Exploration 
Program (CxP), in particular Launch Operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). NASA's Exploration Technology 
Development Program (ETDP) is currently funding a project that is developing a prototype FDIR to demonstrate the 
feasibility of incorporating FDIR into the CxP Ground Operations Launch Control System (LCS). An architecture that 
supports multiple FDIR tools has been formulated that will support integration into the CxP Ground Operation's Launch 
Control System (LCS). In addition, tools have been selected that provide fault detection, fault isolation, and anomaly 
detection along with integration between Flight and Ground elements. 
Introduction 
• Fault Detection Isolation & Recovery (FDIR) has been a high-level requirement for NASA's Constellation Exploration Program 
(CxP) since its inception. One of the main drivers for this is to enable more efficient launch processing through faster fault 
isolation. This FDIR requirement has been levied on 3 main components of CxP: the Ares crew launch vehicle (CLV), Orion 
Capsule, and Ground Operations (also commonly referred to as Launch Processing). 
• Under CxP Ground Operations, the Launch Control System (LCS) is being developed to provide the command and control 
capability for Ground processing in support of Ground/Launch Operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). 
• As part of the CxP initial concept development, a reportl entitled "Diagnostic Technology Evaluation Report for On-Board 
Crew Launch Vehicle" was performed by NASA Ames Research Center (ARC). This report evaluated the state of art practice in 
embedded fault detection and diagnosis technologies for Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) requirements development. Based on 
the results of this report, both the Orion and the Ares launch vehicle selected the Testability Engineering And Maintenance 
System (TEAMS) toolset. TEAMS is a Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) product by Qualtech Systems Inc. (QSI) utilized to 
implement FDIR. 
• However, the initial LCS allocation for the FDIR requirement was to have individual sub-systems (Le. Liquid Hydrogen (LH2), 
Liquid Oxygen (LOX), Ground Special Power (GSP), Main Propulsion System (MPS), Avionics, Pneumatics, etc.) perform 
separate FDIR. This approach is similar in nature to how the current Space Shuttle Launch Processing System (LPS) handles 
FDIR at KSC. 
• Recognizing this as an opportunity for improvement, ETDP approved a FDIR task under NASA's Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate (ESMD). This task is funded under the Intelligent Systems Health Management (ISHM) project. 
Introduction 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
(ESMD) 
Introduction 
• The FDIR task, is one of several tasks in the ISHM Project for ETDP. All ofthese tasks are developmental in nature and have a 
goal of maturing technologies and methods. Under this approach, FDIR is intended and designed to be integrated with 
Ground Operations to automate fault detection and isolation during maintenance and checkout, as well as launch 
countdown activities of ground and launch vehicle systems. In addition, the FDIR architecture will support the integration of 
severallSHM capabilities or tools. 
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FDIR Task/Project 
• As part of this task's effort, the main goal of the FDIR task is to prove the feasibility of a certifiable FDIR approach for CxP 
ground operations and to reduce the associated technology risk in implementing it. In order to support this main goal, the 
FDIR task has several objectives that have been formulated. The first objective is to select, develop and mature ISHM tools 
to provide anomaly detection and FDIR for CxP ground operations. 
• Under ARC leadership, two tools have been selected for FDIR. The TEAMS toolset has been chosen as the fault isolation tool 
due to the commonality with the Ares Launch Vehicle and Orion Crew Vehicle. The ARC developed Inductive Monitoring 
System (IMS) has been chosen as the anomaly detection tool. 
• The second objective of the FDIR task is to develop an architecture for integrated FDIR, including both vehicle and ground. 
This architecture supports not only the real-time operations, but also model integration for ground and flight/vehicle fault 
models. Details of the functional fault modeling required by the TEAMS toolset is presented in another paper2 at this 
conference. 
GOP Cooperation 
• In support of an integrated ground and flight modeling effort, the scope ofthe FDIR task was increased to allow a 
cooperative effort with the Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype (GDP) project. Ares I-X was the first uncrewed test flight of 
the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. The Ares I-X GDp3 was a project to produce a prototype ground diagnostic system that was 
demonstrated during Ares I-X pre-launch periods at KSC. In addition, and more importantly, the prototype was deployed to 
Hangar AE at KSC. At Hanger AE, the prototype was interfaced with live data from the Ares I-X vehicle. During the Ares I-X 
launch, outputs of the tools were displayed in Hangar AE successfully. 
GDP Cooperation 
ETOP ISHM Scope 
Legend: 
FFM : Functional Fault Model 
FOIR: Fault Detection, Isolation & Recovery 
lH2 : Uquid Hydrogen Subsystem 
TVC: Thrust Vector Controller Subsystem 
CxP-Wide Deployment 
Decision for FDIR 
* Ground Diagnostic Prototype task led by Mark Schwabacber/ARC 
Additional Objectives 
• Additional objectives include providing a path for certification of the FDIR architecture along with assessing FDIR 
performance capability. Performance testing of the TEAMS real time toot was performed at the vendor's location, and 
documented. These results were presentedS at an earlier IEEE conference. The task will also provide 
implementation/deployment options for integration with in LCS. 
• Finally, the task has an out-year objective to initiate proof-of-concepts for ground subsystem prognostics applications which 
is beyond the scope of this paper to cover. For ease of purpose, the FDIR task will be referred to as the FDIR project in the 
rest of this paper . 
• 
• lCS & FDIR Architecture 
• CxP ground processing/operation's LCS is a typical customized command and control system. 
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FDIR Architecture 
• The FDIR project team has evaluated numerous architectural issues in determining what they feel is the optimum 
architectural solution for FDIR. As shown in Fig. 5, this architecture allows the addition of tools without changing the higher 
level architect of FDIR or its interfaces with LCS. This architecture allows the embedding of FDIR within LCS with minimal 
impact at design time and in future sustaining engineering. 
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Integrated FDIR Architecture 
• The FDIR project team, in conjunction with the LCS project team, evaluated numerous approaches to determine the 
optimum insertion ofthe FDIR architecture into the LCS system. The project teams inserted FDIR functionality into several 
areas of LCS. Once the FDIR functionality has been inserted into the command and control structure, we refer to this 
functionality as Integrated Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (IFDIR). 
• As can be seen in the figure, the FDIR functionality is allocated into three main areas of LCS as follows: 
• FDIR Server Partition- This is a partition where the FDIR application software tools run. Currently TEAMS and IMS are the 
only selected tools for FDIR. 
• Application Server Partition - This is the partition where Integrated Launch Operations Applications (ILOAs) and an 
application specific to FDIR will reside. 
. 
• Display Server Partition - This is a partition where the display services run that enable end user viewing of FDIR results. 
• This provides the optimal solution to meeting both LCS requirements and FDIR requirements, while keeping sustaining 
engineering for the future in mind. 




• As previously mentioned the TEAMS toolset or software suite was chosen to provide fault isolation for the FDIR project. The TEAMS 
software products include TEAMS Designer, TEAMS-Real Time (RT) and TEAMS Remote Diagnostic Server (RDS). TEAMS Designer is the 
user interface for building and analyzing the functional fault models (FFMs). It provides a graphical environment where the system's 
failure modes, components, hierarchical structure, interconnections, and observation points are captured in block diagrams that closely 
resemble system schematics. TEAMS-RT is the software engine that interprets a set of pass or fail results at the observation points to 
determine whether the failure modes and components in the model are good, bad, suspect or unknown in real-time. TEAMS RDS is a 
server application which provides session management and archival services for one or more instances of TEAMS-RT. Although TEAMS-
RT is a standalone product, a customer may opt to use TEAMS RDS for its management features in lieu of writing custom software that 
performs the same functions. The TEAMS COTS products have more capability than FFM creation and real-time fault isolation, but the 
tool was chosen for the FDIR project specifically for those functions. 
• After a model is created in TEAMS Designer, the model information is exported in the form of a dependency matrix (D-Matrix) . The D-
Matrix contains rows of failure modes and columns of observation points, or test points. If a particular failure mode is detectable by a 
test point, a one is placed in the D-Matrix at the intersection of the failure mode and test point. A model will export one D-Matrix for 
each system mode or configuration that is identified by the modeler. The system modes are defined by unique combinations of 
switches in the model that enable or disrupt the failure effect propagation paths (FEPPs) . 
• Once the D-Matrices have been defined, the TEAMS-RT engine uses them to isolate faults to a failure mode or modes based on the pass 
or fail state of the test points. The TEAMS-RT engine outputs lists of failure modes that are "bad", "suspect" and "unknown", and all 
other failure modes are assumed "good." A failure mode which is "good," or not failed, is one which is mapped to any test point with a 
pass result. A "bad" failure mode IS one which has a FEPP to a test point with a failed result, where the test point is not mapped to any 
other failure modes besides failure modes that have already been determined to be "good." A "suspect" failure mode is one which has 
a FEPP to a test point with a failed result and the failure mode is not the only failure mode mapped to that test point. "Suspect" failure 
modes are by definition an ambiguity group for a single test point. Finally, "unknown" failure modes are those failure modes whose 
FEPPs map only to test points for which there are no pass or fail results. 
• Since the model includes hierarchy information that relates a failure mode to a component or other higher level (such as a line 
replaceable unit or subsystem), the same D-Matrix can be used to diagnose the system at different levels of resolution depending on 
the needs of the application 
IMS 
• IMS uses a data-driven machine learning technique that automatically extracts system parameter relationships and 
interactions from archived nominal system data producing a monitoring capability quickly for almost any system for which 
archived nominal data is available. IMS does not require knowledge engineers or modelers to capture precise details of 
system operation. It only requires archived nominal data. Lacking that, IMS can learn the relationship based on the 
parameter values from a high-fidelity simulator, with the accuracy of the simulator determining the accuracy of learned 
monitoring capability. When neither operational nor simulated data is available for a system, IMS can be trained on a very 
similar system. However, as with simulated data, the accuracy of the learned monitoring capability will depend on the 
similarity of the systems. 
• IMS has two phases: training and monitoring. Training is done off-line and monitoring can be done on-line (real-time 
monitoring) or off-line (post-flight analysis). The goal during the training phase is to learn how the system normally behaves. 
The input to the learning algorithm is a data set representing nominal system operation. The training flow consists of the 
following: From the full set of data sensors available, the user selects the subset of parameters that adequately encode the 
behavior of the system. These parameters, normalized and weighted to assign desired significance, are formed into a data 
vector. The user can then clean/validate the training set by eliminating outlier vectors. IMS is trained on most of the cleaned 
data set, with the exception of a portion left out to validate learning generalization. When satisfied with the performance 
(generalization and speed on the target hardware), IMS is trained on the full, cleaned data set. 
• The goal of the monitoring step is to determine if the system is behaving differently than during operations when training 
data was collected . The monitoring step extracts the relevant parameters from the incoming real-time system data, 
normalizes and weights them, as was done during training, and then compares the incoming vector to the clusters 
generated during training. It outputs similarity scores, the distance between the vector and the nearest cluster for the vector 
as a whole (a composite score) and a distance from the nearest cluster for each parameter separately. These distances 
represent the deviation of the current operation from nominal operations as defined by the training set - a measure of how 
"out of family" the behavior is. These scores can then be sent through an Alert Logic Filter to filter out data spikes and issue 
alerts only when a specified number of sequential incoming vectors are anomalous. Alternatively, the scores can be plotted 
allowing users to assess the severity of any system anomalies and watch for worsening trends over time. 
Conclusion 
• FDIR is intended and designed to be integrated with Ground Operations to automate fault detection & isolation and anomaly 
detection during maintenance and checkout as well as launch countdown activities of ground and launch vehicle systems. 
The FDIR architecture described in this paper supports the integration of tools to support these activities and future tools. 
• The two initial tools chosen for incorporation into the FDIR project are the TEAMS toolset from Qualtech Systems Inc. and 
IMS from NASA ARC. By integrating FDIR functionality into LCS as described in this paper the following benefits are expected 
to be achieved: 
• Increased Crew Safety - Improve timely detection of mission-critical and life-critical failures and the 
identification/initiation/execution of recovery procedures. 
• Increased System Availability - Improve system availability to perform intended mission and meet CxP operability 
requirements. 
• Reduced Lifecycle Costs - Provide more efficient and effective isolation of failures. 
• It is hoped that the knowledge gained during the execution of this project will be applied not only to current and future 
launch systems at KSC, but will also find use for future extra-planetary missions 
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